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ALIMONY AND THE INCOME TAX
Taxable Status of Alimony and Support Payments
By LAWRENCE R. BLOOMENTHAL
Lawrence R. Bloomenthal is a member of the law firm, Schwartz & Bloomenthal, Cleveland, Ohio. He
was formerly Principal Attorney in the Office of Counsel to the North Central Division, Technical Staff,
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Cleveland. Mr. Bloomenthal is also on the faculty of Fenn College, Cleveland,
Ohio, as a lecturer on “Federal Tax Practice” and “Accounting for Lawyers."

We are happy to be able to present this article to the readers of “The Woman C.P.A.” This article
was the basis of a speech by Mr. Bloomenthal before the Cleveland Chapter, ASWA.

ular monthly payments for support of the
wife and children. Here, because, there is
no court order for divorce or separation,
the husband cannot deduct these payments
as “alimony” and the wife is not taxable
on the amounts received.
Let us assume that on a later date, this
same husband neglects or refuses to con
tinue the agreed monthly payments and the
wife obtains a court judgment for the
amount in arrears. This was the problem in
Terrell vs. Commissioner.3 The husband
had claimed deductions of $12,000 in 1942
and the same amount in 1943 for payments
made to his estranged wife from whom he
was not divorced. The Commissioner, how
ever, ruled that these amounts were not
“alimony” but actually payments in satis
faction of judgments obtained by her to
enforce the separation agreement. Both
the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the govern
ment’s contention that these payments were
for breach of contract and not deductible
as alimony.

Accountants frequently find it necessary
today to familiarize themselves with the
taxable status of alimony and separate
maintenance payments. Before 1942, such
contributions were neither taxable to the
recipient nor deductible by the payor.1
Since that time, Sections 22 (k) and 23 (u)
have been added to the Internal Revenue
Code.2 Under these new statutes, the
husband may deduct alimony payments and
the wife is required to report them as in
come provided five basic requirements are
met:
(1) There must be a divorce or legal
separation under a decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) Only those alimony payments
made after entry of the decree
will be recognized.
(3) A lump sum settlement in lieu of
alimony is not deductible since
the statutory benefit is limited to
periodic payments. There is one
exception provided for in cases
where a fixed principal sum is to
be paid off in installments over a
period of 10 or more years from
the date of the decree or settle
ment agreement.
(4) Payments for the support of
minor children or to carry out
a division of property are not con
sidered alimony for income tax
purposes.
(5) Finally, the Court’s decree or a
written instrument incident to
the divorce or separation must
impose a specific obligation to
pay alimony.
Although these five tests seem simple
enough, their practical application is some
times quite difficult. Suppose, for example,
a couple voluntarily decides to separate and
the husband agrees in writing to make reg

Non-Support Orders

Non-support orders, even though author
ized by state law, are not considered the
equivalent of a decree for divorce or separate
maintenance. This distinction is quite im
portant since a misinterpretation may prove
very costly to clients. In 1946, the Tax
Court decided the Kaltchthaler Case4 in
which the Commissioner disallowed a de
duction for support payments made to the
wife pursuant to a court order. The couple
parted in 1935 after 26 years of marriage,
but were not divorced or legally separated.
After Kaltchthaler refused to continue
his contributions to the household, his
spouse sued for desertion and non-support,
obtaining an order requiring him to pay
$36 monthly or face a jail sentence. The
Commissioner contended that this was not
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the type of court order contemplated by
the 1942 amendments. The Tax Court agreed
with the Commissioner that under Pennsyl
vania law, the couple still were husband
and wife, since separate establishments
never had been authorized and there was
no divorce.
Voluntary Payments
Even though a settlement agreement may
be executed in anticipation of a later di
vorce, the husband is not entitled to an in
come tax deduction for support payments
prior to the actual entry of a divorce decree.
The rule is that alimony deductions are
permitted only for payments made after
the decree of divorce or separation has
been entered.5
A husband may be ordered to make fixed
monthly payments for the wife’s support
pending a hearing on the merits of the di
vorce action. But, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals and the Tax Court have upheld
the Commissioner’s refusal to allow a de
duction for alimony “pendente lite”, even
though authorized by state law.6 Similar
treatment is accorded amounts paid while
separate maintenance proceedings are pend

ing, but before a decree is entered.7
While the foregoing distinction may seem
arbitrary and overly-technical, the Com
missioner and the Courts are merely fol
lowing the literal language of the statute.
Once a proper court order has been en
tered, payments made under its authority
are deductible until the original decree is
modified or rescinded. It is customary for
divorce decrees to reserve jurisdiction in
the Court to modify or increase alimony de
pending upon changes in the financial con
dition of either the husband or wife. Similar
provisions frequently are inserted in settle
ment agreements. Even when there is no
such reserved jurisdiction, the parties
themselves may consent to modification of
the original court order. The fact that pay
ments are increased voluntarily and that the
increased sum later is adopted by a court
order as the proper amount of alimony, does
not make the prior increases deductible. Nor
does it assist the husband taxwise even if the
Court decree is made retroactive.
A case decided last year, Van Vlaanderin
vs. Commissioner,8 ruled against the hus
band’s claim for deduction of amounts paid
as retroactive alimony. In 1946, a divorce
decree dating from 1920 was modified at
the husband’s request to increase alimony
from $30 to $100 a week. The Court order
was to serve as authority for the fact that

he had been paying the larger amount vol
untarily since 1942 when his ex-wife was
hospitalized in an institution. The Tax
Court, however, agreed with the Commis
sioner that only the original alimony of $30
weekly could be deducted from 1942 to the
date of the decree in 1946. The Court of
Appeals also affirmed the judgment, holding
that the difference of $70 per week was a
gratuitous contribution to the ex-wife.
Laudable motives are not a sufficient basis
for a tax deduction.
This principle was again applied in the
Sharp case (CCH, Decision 17, 812-15 TC)
where a husband was denied a deduction
for voluntary payment of an ex-wife’s hos
pital expenses.8-a
Nunc Pro Tunc

Another type of retroactive decree in ali
mony cases, known as the nun pro tunc, or
“now for then” judgment, also has been dis
approved by the Tax Court. In the Robert
L. Daine case,9 the husband paid $900 a
month under a voluntary separation agree
ment commencing in 1940. Finally, in 1944,
the wife obtained a court order for separate
maintenance which approved the 1940 agree
ment as well as an amendatory agreement
executed in the later year.
The Commissioner disallowed deductions
taken by Mr. Daine of approximately $11,000 in 1942 and $12,500 in 1943. Judge VanFossan of the Tax Court stated that a “nowfor-then” or retroactive decree of a state
court cannot affect the rights of the Federal
Government under its own tax law. State
laws and court decisions are controlling
in cases involving property rights, but the
Federal laws determine what is taxable as
income or deductible as expenses. Since the
1940 agreement was fully performed before
the state court judgment was entered, the
retroactive features of this decree were
meaningless. Nor did it make any difference
that the court’s order stated that both the
earlier and later agreements were incident
to its judgment.
Lump Sum Alimony
The time and manner of paying alimony
has a direct and material effect on the tax
consequences to both parties. An alimony
and property settlement may be arranged in

any lawful fashion that is mutually agree
able. But, lump sum alimony payments in
lieu of a continuing obligation are not de
ductible from the husband’s taxable income.
This point was settled by the Tax Court
in 1948 in the case of Frank J. Loverin.10
7

That taxpayer was obligated to pay his
former wife $60 a week under the terms of
a divorce decree entered in 1940. Two years
later, the ex-Mrs. Loverin decided to re
marry and in return for a settlement of
$8,500 plus $1,500 attorney’s fees, she con
sented to have the divorce decree modified
so as to eliminate monthly support and
maintenance.
She agreed also to release Mr. Loverin
from future claims for support. In addition,
she was to dismiss her suit against him for
conversion of personal property. Shortly
thereafter, Mrs. Loverin re-married and a
court order was entered by consent elimina
ting support and maintenance requirements
imposed by the original decree. Loverin paid
$1,000 to his attorneys and then deducted
the total of $11,000 as alimony paid during
1942.
The Commissioner promptly disallowed
the entire amount. It was recognized that
the plan was intended to modify the hus
band’s obligation incident to the divorce,
but the net effect was to cancel them en
tirely. The government insisted that no
part of the $11,000 was deductible. The at
torney’s fees were regarded as personal
expenses and it was contended that the lump
sum alimony of $8,500 could not be classi
fied either as a periodic or installment pay
ment. The Tax Court agreed with the Com
missioner. Since there was but one pay
ment, it could not possibly qualify as an
installment on a principal sum being paid
off more than ten years after date of the
decree or settlement. Consequently, that
portion of the law allowing deduction of
such installment payment up to 10% of
the principal sum in any one year did not
apply. There was the further objection that
the new settlement was not incident to the
divorce, but to her re-marriage.
A more recent case, Joseph D. Fox,11 de
cided in June 1950, involved a tax payer
living in Cleveland. The petitioner and his
wife had been separated since 1935, but
no divorce action was begun until 1945 after
a separation agreement had been executed
by the parties. Under their contract,
monthly payments of $300 each were made
from July to December of 1945 for support
and maintenance of the wife and two
children. This agreement obligated Fox also
to pay $500 in cash immediately upon sign
ing the divorce decree and to deposit $2,000
in escrow to be held for the wife’s benefit
over a five-year period. The $2,500, plus
the five $300 monthly payments, were
claimed as deductions in the husband’s re
turn for 1945. Disallowance of these items

was sustained by the Tax Court.
Periodic monthly payments after separa
tion, but before entry of the divorce decree
would not be deducted. The $2,500 consti
tuted payment out of the husband’s capital,
not from his income and consequently rep
resented discharge of a lump sum obliga
tion in less than ten years.
Payments Dependent
Upon Contingencies

If the husband’s basic obligation is to
pay a specified principal sum, the courts
will ignore technical variations in the lang
uage. In the case of J. B. Steinel,12 a settle
ment agreement incorporated in the divorce
decree called for payments of $100 monthly
to the ex-wife until the sum of $9,500 has
been paid. Any installments remaining un
paid to her at the date of remarriage were to
be cancelled except those in default or which
came due between the time of re-marriage
and the date the default was paid up.
However, Mrs. Steinel did not marry again,
and the two final payments of $1,200 and
$1,100 respectively were made in 1942 and
1943. Relying upon a novel theory, Mr.
Steinel claimed deductions for this $2,300.
He asserted that there was no fixed obliga
tion for the principal amount payable in
installments since the possibility always had
existed that the wife’s remarriage would
cancel the unpaid balance. Consequently,
these payments were in the nature of peri
odic alimony and were deductible.
The Tax Court disagreed, stating that
there was only a formal difference between
a decree specifying payment of $9,500 in
$100 monthly installments and one requir
ing payments of $100 per month until $9,500 was paid. The contingency of possible
remarriage did not affect the fundamental
arrangement. Since the principal sum was
paid up in less than ten years ... in fact,
at the end of seven years and eleven months
... no deduction was allowable.
Periodic Payments . . .
Fluctuating Amounts

To qualify as deductible, alimony pay
ments must be “periodic”, but the statute
does not define this term. It is clearly settled
that alimony is periodic if it is payable in
fixed sums at regular intervals for an indefi
nite period. This problem arose in the tax
case of Roland K. Young,13 a free lance
movie actor. The agreement was entered
into in 1940 between Young and his wife,
and adopted and incorporated into the di
vorce decree, but neither the total amount
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of alimony nor any definite regular pay
ments were fixed. Instead, it was provided
that Young would pay $1,000 monthly for
support and maintenance provided his net
income for the preceding year was $50,000
or more.
Should his income fall below that amount,
all payments were to be reduced propor
tionately. Regardless of the total sum paid
in the interval, all obligations were to cease
at the end of fifty months. It was decided
by the Tax Court that no principal sum had
been fixed because Young actually had no
way of knowing what his net or gross in
come would be in the future. The evidence
showed that his income fluctuated widely
from over $50,000 in 1940 and 1942 to ap
proximately $2,500 annually for the other
two years. Consequently, the deductions
claimed were allowed.
Support Payments
A sharp distinction is made by statute
between amounts for support of minor
children and those intended for mainten
ance of the wife. If a specific amount or

percentage of the husband’s payments are
“earmarked” for support of minor children,
that portion will not be taxable to the wife
or deductible by him. Should the agreement
or decree fail to distinguish between ali
mony and support of minors, the Commis
sioner will not attempt to make any such
allocation. Instead, the entire amount paid
for her support and that of the children is
taxable to the wife.14
Another aspect of this same problem
arises when there is a specific provision
that a fixed monthly sum shall be paid to
the wife until a child becomes 21, but that
all payments shall cease if the child dies
during minority. Under those circum
stances, the wife has been held not to be
taxable and no deduction was allowed for
the monthly payments.15

to reduce the amount of insurance under
certain conditions in order to increase her
cash income. The amounts representing pre
miums paid in 1942 and 1943 were dis
allowed by the Commissioner, but the Tax
Court decided that they were part of the
agreed percentage of the husband’s income
being paid for alimony and were deductible.
A contrary result was reached in the
case of Meyer Blumenthal,17 where the
husband agreed to pay $100 a week to his
ex-wife until her death or remarriage, plus
payments for each minor child. The agree
ment required him to designate his wife as
irrevocable beneficiary of $65,000 in life
insurance and to keep these policies in
force for the purpose of guaranteeing her
an annual income of $5,200. The divorce
decree incorporated this contract but the
Tax Court decided that the premiums were
in addition to the $100 weekly alimony and
were not deductible.
Sometimes, the policies on the husband’s
life are irrevocably and unconditionally as
signed to the wife and the husband agrees
to continue paying the premiums. This oc
curred in the case of Anita Quinby Stew
art,18 in which the wife was held taxable
on the theory that the policies were her
property and that these premiums were paid
for her account and benefit.
On June 30, 1950, the Tax Court decided
in the case of Lemuel A. Carmichael,19 that
premiums paid on policies placed in escrow
to provide security for future maintenance
payments for a minor child were not de
ductible. Apparently, it makes no difference
that such payments were not made directly
to the ex-wife; the essential fact was that
they were intended for the child’s benefit.
Agreement Incident to Divorce

Since Section 22 (k) specifically refers to
periodic payments fixed by the terms of a
written instrument, no substitutes will be
recognized. An oral agreement may be valid
in the state where a divorce is granted, but
will have no effect upon the husband’s tax
able income so far as deductions are con
cerned.20 On the other hand, a letter signed
by the taxpayer and accepted by the wife
has been held to be a “written instrument”
within the meaning of this statute.20a
It is necessary also that the written
settlement agreement be “incident” to the
divorce or separation. Ordinarily, this re
quirement is satisfied if the agreement is
entered into contemporaneously with and
made a part of the order granting a divorce.
While this is the safest procedure to fol
low, there have been some instances in

Insurance Premiums
Payment of premiums by the husband on
life insurance to the wife frequently is re
quired in settlement agreements. Deducti
bility of such payments depends on whether
they are part of, or in addition to, fixed ali
mony. In the case of Boies C. Hart,16 an
out-of-court settlement obligated the hus
band to pay 38½% of his income to or on
behalf of his divorced wife, including life
insurance premiums. The divorce settlement
incorporated this agreement and made no
other division of property or support ar
rangements. The wife was given the right
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which the husband was permitted to take
the deduction because he proved that an
agreement not mentioned in the decree ac
tually was incident to the divorce or separa
tion. The outcome of disputes on this point
will depend entirely upon the facts in each
case. In general, the sequence of events, ac
tions of the parties and time elapsed be
tween the signing of the agreement, tiling
suit and entry of a decree will be given
considerable weight.20b

(1948) 10 T. C. 406: See also; Frank R. Casey (1949)
12 T. C. 224; John H. Lee (1948) 10 T. C. 834; Estate of
Frank P. Orsatti (1949) 12 T. C. 188: Harold M. Fleming
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Cash Payments
To qualify for the deduction, payments
also must be in cash or its equivalent.21 For
example, paying the divorced wife’s income
tax as part of the agreed settlement is de
ductible.22 But, the rental value of a house
which the ex-wife is allowed to occupy rentfree does not qualify as cash or its equiva
lent.23 Payments which are made a contin
uing obligation after death of the husband
will still be taxable to the wife.24
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object to T. V. commercials so much after
hearing Mrs. Cecil Fuller, Vice-president
of Tucker-Wayne Advertising Co., explain
at the February meeting that advertising
is a force which has accomplished some
amazing and wonderful things—not only in
the distribution of manufactured products
and services, but in the miracle of The
American Way of Life.

was Mr. A. O. Turek, tax attorney for
Sears, Roebuck & Co. Mr. Turek has spe
cialized in taxes for 15 years and partici
pates in the University of Chicago Annual
Tax Conference. Grace Dimmer, C.P.A.,
and Adrienne Munroe, national president
and national secretary, respectively, of
ASWA, attended the March meeting and
heard a discussion on “Hospital Accounting
as It Affects Public Relations” by Mr. L. C.
Mortrud, Administrator of Ingalls Memor
ial Hospital.
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